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Hybrid Governance Model without Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD): A Constitutional Study on Representation in Nusantara Capital City

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Abstract: The relocation of the state capital to Nusantara Capital City (IKN) raises concerns about political representation. The IKN Authority, which operates at the ministerial level, performs local government functions without a Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD). This normative legal research analyzes the regulations regarding citizen representation as outlined in Law No. 3 of 2022 and compares these regulations with models from other special regions in Indonesia, as well as the capitals of other countries. The findings indicate that the current institutional design of the IKN is highly centralized under the oversight of the central government, which risks undermining democratic legitimacy. Comparative studies of Canberra and Brussels highlight the necessity for representative mechanisms, both full legislative and semi-legislative, to effectively articulate public aspirations. This study recommends adopting a hybrid model that integrates the supervisory functions of provincial DPRDs or local representative bodies with cen-

tral authority through structured coordination. This approach aims to establish special regional governance that is adaptive, accountable, and consistent with the principles of constitutional democracy.

Keywords: political representation; special regions; DPRD; IKN Authority; constitution

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I. Introduction

Modern democracy is based on the belief that every citizen has the right to express their aspirations and influence public decision-making through legitimate means. In local governance, local legislative institutions play a crucial role by not only drafting regulations but also overseeing functions and representing the community’s interests. In various countries, political dynamics and institutional designs indicate that the presence of these institutions is not always deemed essential (Kresl, 1996, p. 795). Some regions, for historical, political, or administrative reasons, have opted for or been directed to adopt a government model without local legislatures. This raises an important academic question: to what extent can the principle of political representation be upheld

when one of the fundamental pillars of local democracy is removed from the structure of local government?

In Indonesia, the establishment of regions with special status often involves adjustments to the overall local government structure (Dressel and Mietzner, 2012, p. 391). Jakarta, Yogyakarta, and Papua exemplify different approaches to balancing administrative needs with the political legitimacy recognized by the constitution (Aspinall et al., 2003). In Jakarta, legislative authority is concentrated at the provincial level, which means that the city government does not have its own Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD). Yogyakarta, on the other hand, upholds a constitutional monarchy system where political authority is deeply rooted in cultural and historical frameworks (Suryadinata et al., 2003). Meanwhile, Papua combines the Papuan House of Representatives with the Papuan People's Assembly to serve as a platform for aspirations based on cultural identity (Halmin, 2006). These models illustrate that legislative arrangements in specific regions are not merely technical products of law, but also the outcome of political considerations that influence the quality of the relationship between citizens and government officials.

The Capital City of the Archipelago (IKN) is a special administrative area established under Law No. 3 of 2022 to serve as the center of Indonesia's new government. It operates directly under the President and does not have a Regional House of Representatives (DPRD). These characteristics set it apart from most other autonomous regions in Indonesia and present unique challenges in designing political representation and governance. According to Widnyani, multiple studies have examined the institutional design of special regions. However, most of this research has focused on the presence of regional legislatures as a crucial element of governance (Widnyani et al., 2024). Purnomo notes that studies specifically addressing special areas originally created without a DPRD, such as IKN, are still limited. Furthermore, the majority of research emphasizes the administrative and political aspects of decentralization rather than a normative-constitutional analysis of how the absence of regional legislative institutions affects the principle of political representation (Purnomo et al., 2025, p. 73). This research seeks to address this gap by proposing a synthesis approach that com-

bines constitutional analysis, international comparative studies, and the administrative characteristics of the IKN. It aims to formulate a model of political representation that is adaptive and suitable for governance in special administrative areas without a DPRD (Mukhlis et al., 2025, p. 121).

Unlike other special regions in Indonesia that have local legislative bodies, the institutional design of the Nusantara Capital City Authority does not include a Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD) as a formal means of political representation. The absence of this local parliament has created a new phenomenon in the structure of subnational governance in Indonesia, which has traditionally depended on regional legislatures as part of the principles of autonomy and public representation outlined in Art. 18 of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. According to Ria, this situation opens up opportunities for studying the normative and administrative implications of a governance model without a DPRD. It also encourages the development of alternative mechanisms that can ensure the representation of public interests without compromising the effectiveness of the administration of the national capital (Ria et al., 2025, p. 53). The hypothesis of this study is that the absence of a DPRD in the Nusantara Capital Authority necessitates a different political representation model from the conventional one. Relying on the DPRD for political representation may no longer be suitable for special regions that have unique administrative and political characteristics (Ostwald et al., 2016, p. 143). This study aims to evaluate how well the institutional design of the IKN Authority meets the function of representation and to explore alternative models that are more appropriate for the constitutional and administrative conditions in the area (Urbinati and Warren, 2008, p. 387).

II. Methodology

This study employs a normative legal approach that incorporates legislative analysis, conceptual studies, and comparative studies. The analysis of legislation focuses on examining the regulations governing the establishment and functions of the Nusantara Capital Authority, particularly concerning the mechanism of political representation.

Conceptual studies aim to develop a theoretical framework regarding political representation in special regions that lack regional legislative institutions. Additionally, comparative studies explore specific regional governance models in various countries to identify best practices and alternative models for effective political representation. The methodology utilized is qualitative, emphasizing the interpretation of legal norms and political concepts that underlie the formation of the Nusantara Capital Authority and its constitutional implications.

This study aims to examine the specificity of the Nusantara Capital Authority, particularly regarding its regional aspects, which notably lack a Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD) for political representation. It will focus on the normative and constitutional implications of this absence on the principle of representation as outlined in the 1945 Constitution. The study intends to formulate a model of political representation that aligns with the characteristics of special regions that do not have regional legislative institutions. This will be achieved through an analysis of normative frameworks, administrative needs, and institutional practices across various jurisdictions. The expected outcomes include mapping the challenges and opportunities related to the institutional design of the IKN Authority, along with policy recommendations that can serve as references for harmonizing constitutional norms and enhancing the effectiveness of local government administration in Indonesia.

III. Constitutionality of the Absence of Political Representation in the IKN Authority Region

The framework of local government in Indonesia is constitutionally regulated by Art. 18 of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. This study affirms the principles of regional autonomy, the division of authority, and the existence of the Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD) as a key element in local governance, representing the people. The DPRD functions as a regional legislative institution with legislative, budgetary, and supervisory powers over the regional executive, making it a primary instrument for implementing the principle of checks and balances in local democracy. Local democracy emphasizes

citizen's participation and the representation of public aspirations as essential components in the decision-making process. In political representation theory, Pitkin defines representation as a relationship in which an individual or group acts on behalf of another party within an institutional framework that provides legitimacy (Pitkin, 1967). Urbinati and Warren further developed this concept by highlighting the deliberative dimension and accountability as key indicators of the quality of representation (Urbinati and Warren, 2008). This notion underscores that the DPRD is a constitutional mechanism designed to ensure political representation at the regional level. However, when a special area, such as the Capital City of the Archipelago (IKN), is established without a DPRD, a fundamental question arises about how these constitutional principles can be effectively realized without compromising the essence of political representation (Hendry et al., 2023, p. 78).

Local democracy refers to the application of democratic principles within local government, encompassing citizen participation, the representation of community aspirations, and accountability in public policy. The process of decentralization significantly impacts how responsive local governments are to community interests (Arifin et al., 2025, p. 63). Effective public policies, particularly in infrastructure development, can enhance political legitimacy at the local level (Napitupulu et al., 2024, p. 20). Studies on local councils further show that inclusive political representation is important because barriers to the participation of groups such as women may narrow the range of interests articulated in local decision-making (Sundström and Wängnerud, 2016, p. 361). In this context, the Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD) acts as an institutional mechanism that links community interests to the decision-making process at the regional level. The absence of the DPRD in special areas, such as the Nusantara Capital City (IKN), raises concerns about what mechanisms can effectively maintain political representation within the constitutional framework.

The relationship between the principles of local democracy and the institutional design of the special region can be clearly observed through the legal provisions that establish the Nusantara Capital City Authority. Law No. 3 of 2022 concerning the State Capital stipulates that the IKN Authority is a ministry-level institution led by a Head

and a Deputy Head, who are appointed and dismissed directly by the President (Art. 10, Para. 3). Notably, this structure does not include the establishment of a Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD), which is typically found in local governments. As a result, the legislative and supervisory functions normally carried out by representative institutions are excluded from the framework of the Authority. Article 12, Para. 1 of the Law grants the Authority full power to perform local government functions, including planning and implementation of development, without a legislative mechanism elected through general elections. Some normative analyses suggest that this single-executive model could undermine the balance between administrative effectiveness and democratic legitimacy, particularly if it is not supported by adequate public participation mechanisms (Sumodiningrat et al., 2022, p. 383). Understanding the Legal Design of the IKN Authority is crucial for assessing how well the principle of political representation can be maintained. This becomes more evident when compared to other special regional institutional models in Indonesia and abroad.

The IKN Authority has sole authority to perform local government functions, as outlined in Art. 10 and 12 of Law No. 3 of 2022. This law states that the Head and Deputy Head of the IKN Authority are appointed and dismissed directly by the President, granting them full authority to manage local government functions, including planning and implementing development projects. Notably, this occurs without the involvement of the DPRD, the local legislative body. This institutional model diverges from the typical framework of local government in Indonesia. To fully understand this distinction, it should be compared to other special regions that are also governed by specific legislation but still maintain formal avenues for political representation.

DKI Jakarta centralizes legislative authority within the provincial DPRD, ensuring that both legislative and supervisory functions exist at a single level of government. In contrast, Yogyakarta combines electoral legitimacy from the DPRD with the historical and cultural legitimacy associated with the position of the Governor. Papua employs a dual model, featuring the Papuan House of Representatives as the legislative institution and the Papuan People's Assembly, which channels aspirations based on cultural identity. This variety demonstrates that

specific territorial contexts do not necessarily lead to the elimination of legislative institutions. Instead, institutional design aims to maintain the representation function. The status of the IKN, which lacks a DPRD, indicates a paradigm shift that necessitates further normative studies to explore alternative forms of constitutionally equivalent mechanisms. The following Table 1 provides a comparative analysis of the political representation models in special regions of Indonesia and the position of the IKN.

Table 1

Comparison of Political Representation Structures in Special Regions in Indonesia

Special Regions	Political Representation Structure	Selection Mechanism	Legal Basis	Normative Notes
Jakarta	Provincial DPRD, without City/Re-gency DPRD	Provincial Election	Law No. 29 of 2007	Centralized legislation and oversight functions at the provincial level
Yogyakarta Resort & Spa	DIY DPRD + legitimacy of Sultan/ Hamengkubuwono as Governor	DPRD Elections; Governor’s office based on lineage	Law No. 13 of 2012	Dual legitimacy: electoral and historical-cultural
Papua	Papuan House of Representatives + Papuan People’s Assembly	DPRP Elections; MRP membership through customary/ religious/female selection	Law No. 21 of 2001 on Special Autonomy for Papua Province	Legislative and cultural representation accommodated
IKN	No DPRD	Local legislative election mechanism does not apply	Law No. 3 of 2022	Political representation through non-legislative mechanisms

Source: Data processed by the authors, 2025

A comparison of the political representation structure in Indonesia's special regions reveals variations in institutional design that reflect differing principles in the regulation of regional legislative functions. In DKI Jakarta, DIY Yogyakarta, and Papua, there is a formal representation mechanism through the Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD), either individually or in conjunction with institutions based on cultural identity. In these three regions, the legislative and supervisory functions continue to operate through constitutional mechanisms that allow for local legislative elections. In contrast, the IKN authority has eliminated this process and has not established a DPRD, resulting in a complete shift of political representation to a non-legislative mechanism, which is now centralized within the central government.

Normative-constitutional analysis reveals that these differences impact the balance between democratic legitimacy and administrative effectiveness. The absence of the Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD) in the new capital, IKN, raises concerns about weakening formal political representation, as outlined in Art. 18, Para. 3, and Art. 1, Para. 2 of the 1945 Constitution. These findings highlight the need to develop a political representation model that can effectively integrate representation functions within a special regional framework, even in the absence of regional legislative institutions.

IV. The Function of Local Democracy in the Local Government System

The principle of political representation and local democracy, as outlined in Art. 18 of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, emphasizes that local governments are established to implement the widest possible autonomy. This autonomy is supported by a supervisory mechanism and channels for public aspirations through regional people's representative institutions. The Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD) serves as a key legislative body at the local level, playing a crucial role in ensuring self-governance, local accountability, and providing checks and balances between the local executive and legislative branches. The presence of the DPRD facilitates a participatory and accountable decision-making process, where regional policies are

evaluated not only from an administrative standpoint but also through the political legitimacy derived from general elections (Hidayat et al., 2025, p. 166). Recent literature indicates that formal political representation mechanisms at the local level significantly influence the quality of governance and the responsiveness of local governments to the needs of their citizens (Talitha et al., 2020, p. 702). Within the framework of constitutional law, the DPRD functions not only as a channel for public aspirations but also as a constitutional institution that ensures that public policy adheres to the principle of people's sovereignty (Irsyada and Wardana, 2024, p. 1695).

The function of the Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD) is significant when considering its absence in the IKN Authority. The DPRD serves as a constitutional instrument essential for maintaining the principles of self-government and local accountability, making it a key player in legislation, oversight, and the expression of public aspirations. As stipulated in Art. 10 and 12 of Law No. 3 dated 2022, the absence of the DPRD in the IKN Authority centralizes these functions entirely within the executive branch. This shift alters the power dynamics at the local level, moving from a two-branch power model to a single-executive model. Such a change poses a risk of diminishing legislative oversight over public policies (Minan et al., 2024, p. 48). Research on special regional governance indicates that the continuity of political representation functions is often preserved through institutional adaptations. For instance, the single DPRD model in DKI Jakarta or the combination of the DPRD with cultural institutions in Papua ensures ongoing citizen participation. However, the lack of a similar mechanism in the IKN creates a normative gap — specifically, the discrepancy between the constitutional principle of political representation and the institutional tools in place to facilitate it.

The single executive model implemented in the IKN Authority, which concentrates local government authority in the hands of the Head of the Authority, directly impacts the constitutional principles established in the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. This centralization of legislative functions and executive oversight alters the balance of power, which, according to Indonesia's constitutional design, is meant to be based on the separation and division of power at both

the central and regional levels. This configuration risks transforming the political accountability mechanism from horizontal accountability, characterized by interactions between the branches of power, into vertical accountability, which relies entirely on supervision from the central government (Ankamah, 2016, p. 292). Within the context of popular sovereignty, the elimination of local legislatures diminishes the formal avenues through which citizens can influence policy-making via their directly elected representatives. This situation may undermine democratic legitimacy in the special administrative region, as analyzed through the lens of constitutional design. Furthermore, the principle of protecting citizens' political rights, as defined in Art. 28D, Para. 3 of the 1945 Constitution, states that "Every citizen has the right to equal opportunities in government." This principle necessitates the existence of institutional mechanisms that enable effective participation in governance. The lack of a legislative framework at the local level in special areas like the IKN requires strong normative justification to avoid contradictions with higher constitutional norms.

The relationship between the principle of political representation outlined in Art. 18 of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia and the guarantee of equal participation for citizens specified in Art. 28D, Para. 3, requires the creation of an institutional mechanism. This mechanism must effectively balance democratic legitimacy and administrative efficiency. A normative analysis of the role of the Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD) shows that its legislative, oversight, and representative functions cannot be fully replaced by a single executive body without weakening political accountability. Constitutional findings indicate that removing local legislative institutions within the IKN Authority's structure shifts accountability from horizontal interactions among branches of government to vertical oversight centered in the central government (Dixon and Landau, 2021, p. 1356). This change is often associated with a decrease in public engagement in the legislative process. The current design of special regional governance, which excludes the DPRD, requires a comparative analysis to identify institutional models that can uphold the principle of political representation while meeting administrative goals. The normative analysis highlights a significant shift in regional power within the IKN,

directly impacting the quality of political representation and public accountability. To better understand these changes, a comparative visualization is necessary. This visualization should illustrate the key differences between the traditional local government model with the DPRD and the single executive model within the IKN, emphasizing the normative consequences and related constitutional implications.

Table 2

**Normative Analysis and Constitutional Implications
of the Absence of DPRD in IKN**

Aspects	With the DPRD (Regional General Model)	Without DPRD (IKN Model)	Normative Impact	Constitutional Implications
Function of Legislation	There is a process of regional legisla- tion through the DPRD	No local legis- lation	The loss of formal channels for the forma- tion of regional regulations	Concentration of legislation in the execu- tive, potentially reducing public control
Supervision Function	The DPRD super- vises the executive	No legislative oversight	Weakening the checks and bal- ances mecha- nism	Political ac- countability shifts to central vertical over- sight
Channeling Public Aspi- rations	Aspirations are channeled through the people’s represen- tatives as a result of the election	Aspirations are managed directly by executives	Potential bias in the selection of public issues	Reducing the right to effec- tive participa- tion (Art. 28D Para. 3 of the 1945 Constitu- tion)
Political Legitimacy	Obtained through electoral mandate	Depends on the President’s appointment	Potential legiti- macy deficit	Contrary to the principle of peo- ple’s sovereignty in Art. 1 Para. 2 of the 1945 Con- stitution

Source: Data processed by the author, 2025

The structural differences between the local government model that involves the DPRD (Regional People's Representative Assembly) and the single executive model in the IKN (National Capital City) demonstrate that changes in institutional configurations have significant impacts. These impacts include the functions of legislation and supervision, the distribution of public aspirations, and political legitimacy. This variation highlights the presence of layered normative consequences, which range from a reduction in the formal space for the creation of regional regulations to a weakening of the checks and balances mechanism. These changes can have implications for the principle of people's sovereignty and the guarantee of equal political participation, as stipulated in Art. 1, Para. 2 and Art. 28D, Para. 3 of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. The comparative mapping of these differences provides an analytical framework to evaluate how the governance of the special IKN area aligns with the principles of political representation and administrative effectiveness from a constitutional perspective.

V. An International Comparative Perspective on Political Representation without Local Parliament

The normative gaps in the institutional design of the IKN Authority, especially regarding the lack of local legislative functions, raise significant questions about how political representation and accountability can be upheld within special administrative regions. To address this issue more thoroughly, a comparative study is necessary. This study should not only examine the formal differences between jurisdictions but also identify governance configurations that can effectively integrate democratic legitimacy with administrative efficiency across various political and legal contexts. The literature on specialized territorial governance indicates that the balance between political decentralization and the degree of administrative centralization is often a key factor in the success of institutional design (Falleti, 2010, p. 53). Understanding this variation in models is essential before exploring how international experiences can inform Indonesian governance.

One commonly referenced example in the study of special administrative regions is Washington, D.C. in the United States. For nearly two centuries, it had no local legislature and was directly controlled by Con-

gress. This arrangement is rooted in the U.S. Constitution, which grants Congress full authority to regulate federal territories (Spitzer, 2015, p. 835). During that period, the political accountability mechanisms in Washington, D.C. relied primarily on national legislative oversight, with limited avenues for consultation with city governments. This situation led to various criticisms regarding the restricted channels of citizen representation. Consequently, this motivated the establishment of the District of Columbia Home Rule Act in 1973, which created the Council of the District of Columbia with limited legislative authority (State Court Report, 2025). These developments indicate that while a system of governance without local legislatures can function administratively, the sustainability of democratic legitimacy requires institutional adjustments to better accommodate the principle of political representation.

The model of government in Washington D.C. represents one approach to managing special administrative regions, emphasizing primary control by the central government while ensuring political representation through institutional adjustments. In contrast, Canberra, as the capital of Australia, was designed to balance administrative efficiency with political representation. The Australian Capital Territory (Self-Government) Act of 1988 established a Legislative Assembly with 25 members who possess full legislative authority over local matters; however, these powers can still be revoked by the Australian Parliament within the framework of federal law (Chapman, 1990, p. 75). This structure promotes a pattern of shared governance, where executive and legislative functions operate separately yet are interconnected. Control over strategic issues such as defense and foreign relations remains the responsibility of the central government (Moon and Sharman, 2003, p. 128). Mechanisms for public participation are facilitated through five-year general elections and community consultation forums, which are integrated into the legislative process, providing citizens with a formal and ongoing opportunity to influence local policy direction.

A comparison of the models used in Washington, D.C., and Canberra reveals significant differences in the institutional design of special administrative areas. These differences range from scenarios where the central government maintains full control to those that create a more balanced distribution of powers between the executive and legisla-

tive branches. This variation suggests that institutional frameworks are closely tied to the political, legal, and historical contexts of each jurisdiction. To ensure political representation, adjustments must align with the existing governance structure. Comparative studies of governance indicate that the sustainability of democratic legitimacy in specific regions typically relies on a mix of established political oversight mechanisms and the executive’s capacity to address strategic issues. Analyzing the differences between Washington, D.C., and Canberra allows for an exploration of key variables, such as the distribution of authority, forms of citizen participation, and central-local hierarchical relationships. Together, these factors shape the institutional logic of special administrative regions. This approach goes beyond simply cataloging the structural characteristics of each jurisdiction; it also examines how different elements interact to influence the balance between democratic legitimacy and administrative effectiveness. The patterns identified in this study will help formulate relevant parameters for the institutional design of the IKN Authority and anticipate potential normative gaps during the implementation stage.

Table 3

**Comparison of Authority and Mechanism of Political Representation
in Special Administrative Regions**

Comparative Aspects	IKN (Indonesia)	Washington D.C. (AS)	Canberra (Australia)
Legal Status	Special administrative areas, regulated through Law No. 3/2022	Federal territories, regulated in the U.S. Constitution and congressional legislation	Federal territories, governed by the Australian Capital Territory (Self-Government) Act 1988
Local Legislative Authority	There is no DPRD; legislative function is vested in the Head of the Authority	There was no local legislature until 1973; there is now a Council of the District of Columbia with limited authority	There is a Legislative Assembly with full legislative authority in local issues

Policy Over-sight	Vertical supervision by the central govern-ment	National legisla-tive oversight (U.S. Congress) and limited consultation	Local legislative over-sight and Australian Parliament interven-tion when required
Formal Public Participation	Through executive channels and limited public consultation	Limited before 1973; expanded through lo-cal elections after the Home Rule Act	Five-year elections and community consulta-tion forums
Strategic Issue Control	Central government	U.S. Congress	Australian central government
Implications for Political Repre-sentation	Potentially creat-ing a normative gap between constitu-tional principles and institutional instru-ments	Administrative runs, but democratic le-gitimacy depends on institutional reform	The shared governance model maintains an administrative and representative balance

Source: Data processed by the author, 2025

A comparison of the governance models of special administrative areas, as shown in Table 3, reveals that each jurisdiction adopts an institutional configuration influenced by its unique constitutional context and political goals. These variations go beyond mere technical differences in the division of power; they also illustrate how the principle of political representation can be articulated differently based on the degree of autonomy granted and the accountability mechanisms in place. In the case of the IKN Authority, the absence of local legislative institutions positions its governance model closer to a centralized system than to Canberra’s shared-governance model. However, it shares some similarities with Washington, D.C., before the home rule reform. This comparative analysis is not meant to draw definitive conclusions but rather to outline a theoretically adaptable spectrum of institutional choices. This understanding paves the way for further discussion on the potential formulation of a political representation model that aligns with the Indonesian legal framework and supports the strategic objectives of IKN development, which will be detailed in the next section.

VI. Formulation of a Hybrid Political Representation Model for the IKN Authority

A comparative study of the institutional design of special administrative areas across various jurisdictions indicates that the absence of local parliaments does not necessarily mean a loss of political representation functions, provided that alternative mechanisms are available to ensure accountability and public participation. Each model adopted must be tailored to align with the unique constitutional conditions, political configurations, and socio-cultural characteristics of each country. In the context of Indonesia, designing a political representation model for the capital city requires integrating a normative analysis of the national legal framework with findings from comparative studies of specific domestic regions, as well as insights from relevant international experiences. This approach aims to create an institutional design that adheres to the principles of people's sovereignty outlined in the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, while also maintaining the necessary managerial capacity for effective administration of the national capital.

Strengthening the analysis of the institutional design of the IKN Authority reveals that the ideal political representation model is a hybrid approach, combining formal representation mechanisms with participation based on cultural identity. This model is developed in line with the principles of constitutional democracy outlined in Art. 1, Para. 2, and Art. 28D, Para. 3 of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, which guarantees equality, legal certainty, and the right of citizens to participate in government. Administrative effectiveness is a crucial element for ensuring the government can perform its strategic functions without unnecessary procedural hurdles. At the same time, public accountability achieved through clear oversight and accountability mechanisms strengthens the legitimacy of institutions. This hybrid model positions the IKN Authority as a coordinating body among the central government, local administrative units, cultural representative institutions, independent supervisory agencies, and civil society. The coordinating relationships among these actors are illustrated in Fig-

ure 1 that outlines points of interaction and the coordination functions each actor plays in supporting political stability and adaptability within the governance of the special IKN region (Kuhlmann and Marienfeldt, 2023, p. 318).




Figure 1. Coordination Chart of the IKN Authority Hybrid Model

Based on this conceptual framework, the relationship among institutional actors within the hybrid model of the IKN Authority is illustrated through a coordination. In Figure 1 highlights five main nodes: the central government, local administrative units of the IKN Authority, cultural representative institutions, independent supervisory agencies, and civil society. These nodes are interconnected by two-way coordination lines. Each node is assigned a coordination function that reflects its specific role, such as strategic policy formulation, normative oversight, delivery of public aspirations, and administrative implementation. The resulting coordination pattern is complementary, with the central government maintaining strategic control while the other nodes contribute to participation, oversight, and policy implementation. This visualization clarifies how power distribution and political representation can

be operationalized together without compromising administrative effectiveness.

The application of the principle of power distribution and political representation in special administrative areas necessitates an institutional design that recognizes the interrelationships among the executive body, channels for public participation, and the oversight mechanism. Relevant models for the IKN Authority may include an organizational structure with legislative or semi-legislative units that provide normative input for strategic policies, alongside administrative coordination with the central government. Public participation can be formalized through periodic consultative forums integrated into the policy planning and evaluation processes. This should be supported by procedural arrangements that ensure transparency in access to information and the decision-making process. Experiences from Canberra and Brussels demonstrate a pattern of shared governance that places control of strategic issues in the hands of central authorities, while domestic matters are managed through participatory mechanisms. This approach effectively balances democratic legitimacy with administrative efficiency (Askim et al., 2017, p. 569). In the context of IKN, this model can be adapted to maintain strategic control by the central government while also creating opportunities for structured political representation that sustainably articulates local aspirations.

Table 4

Comparison of Institutional Elements as a Basis for Formulating the Ideal Political Representation Model for the IKN Authority

Key Aspects	Findings from IKN (Indonesia)	Findings from Washington D.C. (USA)	Findings from Canberra (Australia)	Relevance for the Ideal Model of IKN
Legal Position	Authority under the President, without the DPRD	City government under full control of Congress (pre-1973)	<i>Legislative Assembly</i> within the framework of federal law	Requires a clear position in the law and derivative regulations to regulate the representation function

Institutional Structure	Full executive centralization	Local executives without legislature, relying on central control	Separation of legislative-executive functions at the local level	Establishment of a limited local representative body with oversight functions
Political Representation Scheme	Consultation with the central government, limited participation	Citizen representation through non-legislative consultative mechanisms	Five-year elections and community consultation forums	Adoption of a hybrid mechanism combining limited local elections and structured public consultation
Administrative Effectiveness	Relatively high in the early phases; Low Citizen Participation	Administrative stable, democratic legitimacy low	Effective administration, high political participation	Balancing administrative effectiveness and democratic legitimacy
Normative Implications	Void of political accountability instruments	Home Rule Act reform strengthens legitimacy	The <i>shared governance model</i> maintains stability & representation	Development of special regulations that balance central government interests and citizens' participatory rights

Source: Data processed by the author, 2025

To identify the political representation model for the IKN Authority, we need to synthesize findings from the comparative studies discussed earlier. This synthesis aims to map the institutional elements that have been effective in various jurisdictions and then rearrange them to align with Indonesia's constitutional needs and administrative characteristics. The mapping process involves reviewing five key dimensions: legal standing, institutional structure, political representation schemes, administrative effectiveness, and normative implications. These dimensions serve as the analytical framework for developing an ideal political representation model. A comparative summary is presented to highlight the relevant similarities and differences, which will inform the formulation of a model for the IKN Authority.

The mapping of the five institutional dimensions serves as a tool for analyzing how well the political representation within the IKN Authority aligns with the principles of people's sovereignty and maintains

effective management capacity. Not all elements of the appellate jurisdiction were fully adopted due to variations in constitutional contexts, legal systems, and national political characteristics. The adaptation process involves selecting relevant elements, which include establishing a clear legal framework through derivative laws and regulations, creating a well-structured mechanism for public participation, and implementing a supervisory system that is accountable and proportionate to administrative needs.

According to Law No. 3 of 2022 concerning the State Capital, there is no formation of a Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD) in the IKN area. This means that political oversight is centralized and controlled by the central government, specifically through the IKN Authority. While this approach ensures adherence to national strategic policies, it risks limiting the political representation of local communities. This study proposes an alternative institutional design that involves a regional legislative oversight mechanism. For example, this could include the participation of the East Kalimantan DPRD or the establishment of a small-scale local representative body with the authority to provide normative input and supervise the strategic policies of the IKN Authority. This model integrates the principle of *trias politica* with a participatory political representation mechanism. In this structure, the executive function remains with the IKN Authority, the legislative function is limited and consultative, and public oversight is facilitated through an open accountability forum.

Figure 1 illustrates a five-dimensional coordination framework with the IKN Authority at the center. This central node interacts with five key components: (1) legislative oversight (DPR/Council) through supervision and legislative functions; (2) the National Government via strategic policies and regulations; (3) administrative authority through technical implementation; (4) cultural representation by integrating local identity; and (5) public accountability through information disclosure and community participation. This design aims to balance the strategic control of the central government with structured political representation at the local level, while also addressing gaps in the normative framework of IKN governance.

VII. Conclusion

The design of the Nusantara Capital Authority, which operates without a Regional People's Representative Council, raises significant concerns regarding the principles of political representation and local democracy as mandated by Art. 18 of the 1945 Constitution. A comparative analysis of special territorial governance models in Indonesia and various other national capitals indicates that even limited representative mechanisms are crucial for maintaining democratic legitimacy and public accountability. A fully centralised governance structure may restrict citizens' political participation, highlighting the need for a hybrid governance model that balances administrative effectiveness with the functions of political representation. This study recommends formulating new norms in the derivative regulations of Law No. 3 of 2022 to facilitate the establishment of local representative mechanisms in the IKN. This approach should not undermine the coordination and control abilities of the central government, thereby achieving a balance between the IKN's institutional design and the principles of constitutional democracy.

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