kulawrKutafin Law ReviewKutafin Law Review2713-05252713-0533MSAL10.17803/2713-0533.2023.1.23.110-136kulawr-197Research ArticleHUMAN RIGHTS AND MODERNITYIrreversible Choices and Future Generations’ Rightshttps://orcid.org/0000-0001-8646-5316PalombellaG.

Gianluigi Palombella, PhD (Law), Professor of Applied Legal Theory, Coordinator of the PhD in Law and Director of Center for Interlegality Research (CIR) Scuola Sant’Anna

36 Piazza Martiri della Libertà, 56127 Pisa

Gianluigi.Palombella@santannapisa.itInstitute of Law, Politics and DevelopmentItaly202304042023101110136Copyright © Palombella G., 20232023Palombella G.Palombella G.Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.https://kulawr.msal.ru/jour/article/view/197

The article revolves around the question whether, given some very “fundamental threats” to future generations’ living, their very conditions of survival can be construed as rights. The issue has to tackle the problem of the non-existence of the presumptive holders of such a right, as well as with the problem of their (non-)identity. The article shows the reasons for separating what we owe to future persons under the challenge of some fundamental threats for humanity from our will to hand down our cultural and ethical ideas of the good information and eventually from paternalistic or selfish imposition upon future generations of our irreversible choices. The framework refers essentially to a conceptual grammar of justice. Moreover, it is suggested to articulate rights through the lens of “disposability” and “non-disposability” principles.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.