The desire to achieve truth is an important feature of the civilization that developed in the territories of the far and near Mediterranean in the 8th-2nd centuries BC and exists nowadays. Law, considered as a description of the essential properties of social reality, has been formed as a system of means that makes it possible to establish in a conflict situation the truth regarding the facts that are subject to assessment by the law enforcer (usually the court). Recently, however, the law’s focus on truth has been questioned as its achievability has been contested in philosophy and rhetoric. The lack of demand for true knowledge, its historicity, difficult achievability, fundamental nature of lies, and the dominance of pseudo-true knowledge are pointed out. It is noted that similar processes are reflected in the legal understanding of truth, which does not negate its fundamental significance for law. At the same time, statements about the impossibility of achieving truth in a dispute are often based on seemingly true, but in fact incorrect statements (so-called argumentative tricks); those can be overcome with the use of rhetoric. A typology of such tricks is given. It is pointed out that classifying tricks as acceptable is incorrect, since they constitute deception, although not prohibited by law. Tricks that go beyond the scope of discussion (tricks of appeal) are considered. Methods are proposed to counter them with rhetoric, which makes it possible to clearly demonstrate the fallacy of the relevant statements and maintain confidence in the possibility of establishing truth in the legal process, which, in turn, ensures the preservation of social justice.