The c onstitutionalism movement aims to organize a society under the rule of law to protect the human person. For that purpose, constitutions usually establish several mechanisms of checks and balances. However, contemporary authoritarian tendencies refrain from resorting to disruptive institutional changes. Latin American autocrats, in general, no longer seek to implement a constitutional design that aligns with their agenda or aspirations to remain in power. Instead, they aim to use the institutional forms of liberal constitutionalism to undermine the core of democracy. Those autocratic tendencies perform their powers as wolves in sheep’s clothing. This kind of manoeuvre has come to be known as “abusive constitutionalism” and is probably one of the greatest threats to the democratic consolidation of the region. In this article, we will examine three cases of abusive constitutionalism — Argentina, Venezuela, and Peru — where some of the three branches of government respected institutional procedures but undermined one of the core foundations of constitutional democracy: judicial independence.