The Logic Paradigm of Buchanan’s Constitutional Economics
https://doi.org/10.17803/2313-5395.2020.1.13.124-139
Abstract
Buchanan believes that the modern government operates between the Leviathan model and the democracy model, and the role of the Democratic restriction mechanism trusted by the public is increasingly weak. Therefore, a new form of political technology and democracy is required to control the spread of bureaucracy. Hence, Buchanan proposed to put “constitutionalism” before “democracy” and combine “rule restriction” with “non-rule restriction” to realize his constitutional proposition. Buchanan’s constitutional economics is composed of methodological individualism, contractualism and the principle of consensus. This paradigm has standardized and renovated the existing theories of law and politics.
About the Author
Mingyu Liu
Nanfang College of Sun Yat-sen University
China
China
M.L.Lecturer of basic legal theory, Nanfang College of Sun Yat-sen University.
Wenquan town, Conghua District, Guangzhou, 510970.
References
1. Arrow Kenneth J., Social Choice and Personal Value (Zhiwu Chen,et al. trans., Sichuan People’s Publishing House 1987).
2. Atkinson Anthony B., James M. Buchanan’s Contributions to Econoomics, 1 Scandanavian Journal of Economics 2 (1987).
3. Bernd Hansjürgens, The InÀuence of Knut Wicksell on Richard Musgrave and James Buchanan, 113 Public Choice 95 (2000).
4. Brennan Jeɣrey & Buchanan James M., Constitutional Economics (Keli Feng, et al. trans., China Social Sciences Press 2004).
5. Brennan Jeɣrey & Buchanan James M., The Power to Tax (Keli Feng, et al. trans., China Social Sciences Press 2004).
6. Buchanan James M., A Contractarian Paradigm for Applying Economic Theory, 2 American Economic Review 229 (1975).
7. Buchanan James M., Property And Freedom (Xu Han trans., China Social Sciences Press 2002).
8. Buchanan James M., The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Liberty, 1 The Independent Review 25 (1999).
9. Buchanan James M., The Pure Theory of Government Finance: A Suggested Approach, 57 Journal of Political Economy 496 (1949).
10. Buchanan James M. & Tarlock Gordon, Calculation of Consent: The Logical Basis of Constitutional Democracy (Guangjin Chen trans., China Social Sciences Press 2000).
11. Congleton Roger D., An Overview of the Contractarian Public Finance of James Buchanan, 2 Public Finance Quarterly 152 (1988).
12. Dougherty Keithl., Public goods theory from eighteenth century political philosophy to twentieth century economics, 117 Public choice 239 (2003).
13. Locksley Gareth, Individuals, Contracts and Constitutions: The Political Economy of James M. Buchanan, Twelve Contemporary Economists (1981).
14. Rowley Charles K., The Economic Philosophy of James McGill Buchanan, 3 Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice 185 (1987).
Review
For citations:
Liu M. The Logic Paradigm of Buchanan’s Constitutional Economics. Kutafin Law Review. 2020;7(1):124-139. https://doi.org/10.17803/2313-5395.2020.1.13.124-139
Views:
402
Email this article 
