China and Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Reconsideration and Improvement of Multilateralizing Effect of Most Favored Nation Clause in BIT
https://doi.org/10.17803/2713-0533.2024.3.29.534-568
Abstract
Since the Maffezini case, debates upon the application of the Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) clause have never stopped. Research from the perspective of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) can test the way for further advancement of this issue. The analysis on the international investment arbitration cases involving the SCO states may shed some light on the crucial point on dispute. At present, the bilateral investment treaties (BIT) between China and other states of the SCO are in an urgent need of renewal in order to meet the interests of deepening investment cooperation. Problems of fragmentation of the interpretation method and of unpredictability of the interpretation conclusion of the MFN clauses manifested in international investment disputes involving SCO states will provide concrete preventative suggestions on the updating of the wording of MFN clauses. Under SCO framework, the multilateral effect of the MFN clause can play a model role for other regional integration organizations to build an integrated and multilateral investment treatment system in the fragmented and bilateralism-based framework of international investment law, and in fact promote investment facilitation for regional organizations.
Keywords
bilateral investment treaty (BIT),
Most-FavoredNation (MFN) Treatment,
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO),
Multilateralization
Supporting agencies: The article was prepared with the financial support of the Ministry of Justice of the People’s Republic of China (project No. 22SFB1013)
About the Authors
R. Yanyan
China National Institute for SCO International Exchange and Judicial Cooperation
China
China
Ren Yanyan, PhD, Assistant researcher
Shanghai
Zh. Zhixin
Shanghai University of Political Science and Law
China
China
Zhao Zhixin, Master of International Law
Shanghai
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Review
For citations:
Yanyan R., Zhixin Zh. China and Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Reconsideration and Improvement of Multilateralizing Effect of Most Favored Nation Clause in BIT. Kutafin Law Review. 2024;11(3):534-568. https://doi.org/10.17803/2713-0533.2024.3.29.534-568
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